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Introduction
It is perhaps indicative of perceptions and knowledge about certification that a small sample of
colleagues, on hearing that I was writing this paper, all assumed it was to do with certification
of human factors or ergonomics professionals. On the other hand, this may just illustrate the
self-referential nature of professional groups and genuine concerns about professional
certification, and these concerns are germane to the present argument since certification of
systems may in the end be reduced to certification of professionals in the process (this is an
issue returned to below). In fact, misunderstanding over the term "certification" may be in part
responsible for misgivings and a lack of a wholehearted welcome for it, certainly amongst some
ergonomists of the author's acquaintance. If it is seen as a formalisation and standardisation of
their activities, then there is considerable opposition. When explained as a "design review and
approvals" procedure, response seems more favourable.
Green (1990) believes that the two main factors safeguarding flying from human error are
both related to certification and regulation. First is the increasingly proceduralised nature of
flying whereby as much as possible is reduced to a rule-based activity. Second is the emphasis
placed upon training and competency checking of alrcrew in simulators and in the air, both
generally and for all particular types of aircraft flown. This leaves, believes Green, other human
factors that are relatively unaddressed as yet and which can give rise to human reliability
problems. These include: hardware factors and especially the compatibility of control/display
relationships and the way information is presented in relation to pilots' expectations; social
factors and especially pilot/co-pilot relationships; and system factors including fatigue and
cost/safety trade-offs. He also, importantly, identifies problems with the integration of the
"electronic crew member" following increased automation. Human reliability failures with
artificial intelligence and automation, due to over-reliance on the system fall-safe mechanisms,
or to operator under-confidence in the integrity or self-regulating capacity of the system, or to
out-of-loop effects, are widely accepted as being due to deficiencies in plant design, planning,
management and maintenance more than to "operator error"- Reason's (1990) latent error or
organisation pathogens argument. Reliability failures in complex systems are well enough
documented to give cause for concern and at least promote a debate on the merits of a full
certification programme.
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The purpose of this short paper is to seek out and explore what is valuable in certification, at
the least to show that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages and at best to identify positive
outcomes perhaps not obtainable in other ways. On both sides of the debate on certification
there is general agreement on the need for a better human factors perspective and effort in
complex aviation systems design.
What is at issue is how this is to be promoted. It is incumbent upon opponents of
certification to say how else such promotion be enabled! This is an exploratory and
philosophical review, not a focused and specific one, and it will draw upon much that is not
firmly in the domain of complex aviation systems.
Parallels
There used to be an unwritten "law" in work study - or motion and time study in the USA -
that no one was so enthusiastic about work measurement and standardisation as those whose
own jobs - they felt - precluded any possibility of such a process being applied to them.
Equally, no-one was quicker than management to oppose, utterly, any attempt to assess their
own work when this was suggested, on the grounds that this was inappropriate, represented an
unnecessary effort, and was regardless impossible for any analyst to understand what they
really do.
I saw ftrst hand another salutary lesson within the past year or two. One of my students was
attached to work with a "high flier" in a major UK consultancy; they were charged with
applying quality assurance procedures to the activities of the consultancy itself. This involved
vetting all areas of their operation for compliance with BS5750 and ISO9000, the relevant
service quality assurance standards. The student, and the formerly popular and high achieving
consultant, quickly became the villains of the group, pariahs to be avoided, because they were
seeking to propose some formality for the consultants' work, some prescription of how they
should operate. And what was the core activity of this consultancy group? Advising industry on
the need, processes and procedures for quality assurance!!
What all this illustrates is the difference that perspective and standpoint make to opinions on
formal systems, appraisals, standards and review processes. The reviewers or appraisers see
them as bringing about order and rationality, and as ensuring that "the best" is retained and "the
worst" is identified and eliminated. The reviewed or appraised, on the other hand, see formal
systems as restrictive and petty, unnecessary interferences with their activities, and as leading to
"throwing the baby out with the bathwater."
What other parallels can be drawn? First of course, and top of the agenda for many in the
human factors community, is the notion of certification for human factors and ergonomics
professionals. This is taking place in proposals for the Centre for Registration of Ergonomists
in Europe (CREE) scheme, but has substance with the Board of Certification in Professional
Ergonomics in the USA. A recent "Provocations" article in Ergonomics in Design (Senders &
Harwood, 1993) took contributions from both sides of the argument. Senders and Harwood
themselves point out that one danger is of formality driving out reality, in that any degree or
certificate may become more important in itself than the individual's competence it implies.
(Educators are, in fact, often faced with this from their students, when attempts to discuss and
explore ideas are met by the students' desire to digest directive information tailored to an
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examinationsetting.)Inthesamepiece,SchumacherandDorstquestioncertificationintermsof
need,processandimpact.If wesummariseandgeneraliseomeoftheirobjections,theseare:
•certification does not ensure quality (or integrity or ethics)
• what position will certification have in law?
• do we want the homogeneity that certification might bring?
• prescriptive criteria may stifle innovative designs.
Perhaps reflecting the difficulty of doing so, the response from Hendrick in the same paper
makes little attempt to answer directly some of the questions about whether professional
competence certification is needed at all, concentrating instead on defending the processes
involved. He does, though, argue that certification can promote growth of a discipline and its
image, although admitting that the process cannot guarantee "worthwhile job performance...
competency... [or]...conformance to ethical, moral and professional standards" (Senders &
Harwood, 1993).
What then can possibly be the arguments for certification, if it cannot even guarantee basic
compliancies? To find some value of certification, perhaps we can look at other areas of
ergonomics. In the domain of work organisation and job design, and in particular the
implementation of changed work structures, it is often argued that the content of any change is
of minor importance for successful outcomes compared to the change process. If the best
process possible is put in place then we can afford to "change the change", iterating on the
actual content as required. Translating this idea to certification in complex aviation systems, we
could look upon certification as the means by which an improved development process is
enabled, rather than as a limitation and detailed specification of the content of the development.
From the fields of product liability (in the 1970's and 1980's) and health and safety at work
(in the 1990's), we can see some of the more systemic benefits possibly accruing from
certification. Out of the imposition of regimes of strict liability have come better processes or
systems of design amongst producers, and movement to a more beneficial standards regime,
that of horizontal standards, amongst the lawmakers (see below). Consequences of the health
and safety (ergonomics) legislation implemented in 1992/1993 across member states of the
European Community as a result of EC Directives are even more marked. Although it would
not be appropriate to be too starry-eyed and naive about beneficial outcomes, it certainly seems
as if the need for employer conformance with ergonomics criteria and practices has stimulated
the production of tools, techniques, instruments and methodologies for investigation and
diagnosis that will be of value across a range of concerns. Not all of these developments are to
be widely welcomed of course - I imagine we have all been shocked by some of the so-called
"ergonomics aids" now on the market - but the overall effect in general has been one of
dynamic growth in the discipline. The ergonomics community itself has had to produce new
approaches and techniques, improve the validation of existing ones, and generally ensure
greater justification for its guidelines and recommendations. Even colleagues who are dubious
about the value or validity of specific requirements in the new regulations have been pleasantly
surprised by the consequent pressures for quality in methods.
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MANPRINT - Lessons Learned
Can we learn from very close parallels to human factors certification in complex aviation
systems? Nuclear or mifitary systems perhaps form comparable domains to an extent.
The well known MANPRINT developed for procurement in the U.S. Army has been
adopted by both the British Army and, in modified form, the Royal Navy. Reasons claimed by
the British Ministry of Defence for its adoption are as follows (MoD, 1992):
• The perceived success of MANPRINT in the USA, including improved maintainability
of equipment and use of analytical techniques to ensure wider and better usability;
• A desire to identify and achieve the best balance between people and equipment. It is
recognised that "high quality, multi-capable...better equipped motivated and properly
trained" personnel will only result if manpower issues are considered as part of the
equipment procurement process.
• Personnel costs now outweigh equipment costs and it is hoped to provide more control
over these by being better able to anticipate, budget for or reduce costs through design
improvements. It is also anticipated that MANPRINT would give a better specification
generally and thus more cost-effective products, reducing overmanning, poor
performance and errors.
• Better working conditions and reduced training costs;
• Greater requirements for cognitive skills rather than physical and the shrinking pool of
skilled labour available, mean it is desirable to constrain designers to produce operable
equipment for existing specified personnel. These reasons are labelled "skills drift" and
"demographic trough or slide" respectively (Goorn, 1993).
• New health and safety legislation applies to military as well as civilian systems and
"covers areas which have traditionally been regarded as usability rather than safety
issues", again an argument for the broad approach of MANPRINT.
• MANPRINT covers manpower, personnel, training, human factors engineering, health
hazard assessment, and system safety (and habitability and environmental ergonomics
for the navy). This ensures a single source of advice across all human factors issues,
thus preventing or reducing sub-optimality in systems design.
Such support for MANPRINT and presumably for similar certification systems raises three
questions. First, are these claimed advantages real, secondly are they important, thirdly are they
generalisable, especially to civil systems? A sceptic might answer "no", "partly", and "no" to
these questions. Certainly it is easy to be cynical about any claims on the part of the military
establishment to be making efforts to reduce costs for instance. Nonetheless, a more reasonable
view might be to answer: "the claimed advantages seem reasonable"; "yes, they are potentially
very important"; "they might be generalised to other situations in other industries."
In fact, the strongest support for the certification process might derive from the fact that the
claimed advantages are as much or more concerned with process as they are with content. If
the key gains reported for MANPRINT are summarised and generalised, they look like:
• better human-machine systems designs and improved usability
• improved cost-effectiveness and cost control
• widening of the user base
• compliance with ergonomics/health and safety legislation
• more efficient design process.
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Generallytranslatedintosystemsdesignthen,whilstcertificationmightseemtobea
cumbersomeroutetogodown,lookingatthepotentialbenefitsthenthespin-offsmightbe
decisiveinjudgementsastoitsvalue.
Standards for the Certification Process
Certification will require agreement on standards so that it may be useful and feasible. Debate
over type and coverage of standards has a long history in the field of product regulation for
instance. "The trade-off between voluntary and mandatory standards [concerns] acceptability,
applicability and ease of formulation versus possible non-compliance ... even standards
enshrined in legislation are of little value unless there is strict enforcement .... " (Wilson, 1984).
Much support was given to the notion of performance standards rather than construction or
dimensional standards. Problems with safety standards were further identified as: their
inadequacy in scope and permissable levels of risk; their not addressing all foreseeable hazards
or types of behaviour; specifications that tend to be generalised, partial and inadequate; and a
general lack of a standardised format. Although these criticisms are still valid today for product
ergonomics standards, there has been a major change in direction away from product or vertical
standards and towards horizontal and generally hazard-oriented standards. Advantages of these
are said to be faster development, easier updating, greater applicability, more consistency and
better clarity and understanding about necessary safety levels (van Weperen, 1992).
Meister (1984) differentiates "attribute" standards, which describe how the product should
appear or should function, and "performance" standards, which describe how the design
product should perform (pp.215-217, 256-263). He sees the former as being general and
applying mainly to the component or equipment level and the latter as particular at the
subsystem/system level. He criticises the state of human factors standards in much the same
way as consumer product standards have been criticised. As a consequence, Meister (1989) has
subsequently stated that "... whether because the standard lacks substantive data support or
because human factors is generally viewed ... as a constraint on ... freedom to design, MIL-
STD 1472C [for instance] is honoured as much in the breach as in the observance."
In summary, if we are to have certification, then it must be related to some norms or
standards or standardised procedures. In other words, a system might be certified if it can be
shown to have attributes which meet certain recommended values or if its performance meets
acceptable limits on certain recommended criteria. We can add to this a third form of
certification, if it is shown that defined analysis or test methods have been applied to the design.
In this last case, of course, the methods themselves will have to be certified first. Of relevance
to complex aviation technology is a particular case of the last, "there is little doubt that a
principal future use of simulators will be for licensing and certification" (Jones, Hennessy, &
Deutsch, 1985). Principally used now for pilot training and proficiency approval, there seems
no reason why artificial intelligence in the cockpit, and particularly its interaction with crew,
cannot also be assessed in simulators. The interesting issue then is certification of the
simulation system itself!
Currently under consideration is STANAG 3994 AI - the NATO Standardisation Agreement
on the Application of Human Engineering to Advanced Aircrew Systems. The intention of this
is to "standardise methods for the integration of human engineering procedures with the design
and development of advanced aircrew systems." The purpose also is to provide a basis for
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agreements between contractors and procuring agencies on human factors scope, context,
techniques and criteria. The draft STANAG 3994 AI defines a "general human engineering
program model for military systems". The core requirements include those to do with analyses:
• system analysis - mission analysis, function analysis, potential operator capability
analysis, potential equipment identification, function allocation
• analysis of operator/maintainer tasks - timeline analysis, task analysis, critical
task analysis, decision analysis, error analysis, loading analysis
• preliminary system and subsystem design - information requirements analysis,
control requirements analysis, workspace requirements analysis, and environmental
analysis.
In addition, a number of other issues are also defined as requiring agreement between
agency and contractor. These are: programmes of research involving experiments, testing and
dynamic simulations with human subjects; detail on application of relevant human factors
standards; development of software and hardware procedures in operation and maintenance;
production of mock-ups and models for conformance testing; and development and planning
for test and evaluation, including criteria justification and test interpretation details.
Perhaps most critical in terms of any sustainable argument for certification are the
requirements to prepare a "human engineering programme plan." This must identify standards
of relevance to the system and must identify what human engineering activities will be
involved, time-scales and criteria, and should indicate how formal interaction between human
factors specialists and other relevant design specialists will be achieved. Finally, provision is
made for a tailoring of details in the standard to meet any specific requirements of the system
under development.
Taking a domain outsider's viewpoint, several things seem apparent about this STANAG
3994. First, it appears at fast sight to be complex and unwieldy, with potential for great overlap
in particular amongst the many different analyses. Even co-ordinating these, making sure they
are complementary but not too duplicatory (or even contradictory) will be a considerable project
management task. Secondly, on the other hand, it is to be welcomed that so much emphasis is
placed upon analytical activities and not on prescriptions of design detail. However, within
some of these analyses are implied checklist comparison procedures, for instance "... multi-
function control modes, and display menu selections shall be analysed ... and the resulting ...
structure shall be plotted and analysed for ease and effectiveness of use", or "workspace
[requirements] shall be analysed in terms of their access, vision, reach, egress, and emergency
requirements, for the range of body sizes, clothing and protective equipment ..." (p5). This will
presumably bring into play a plethora of other standards, guidelines and recommendations, the
effect of which may be to impose a degree of complexity and restriction on design which is not
commensurate with finding innovative solutions. Thirdly, again on the positive side, the
document does allow for flexibility in its provisions according to circumstances. Finally, and
thinking again about systemic gains, it may be that the most important benefit is the integration
and collaboration required between ergonomists and engineers.
Any undue complexity, as suggested above, may have excessive cost implications. For
instance, even under present regulation systems: "
It is relatively easy for the profitable aidine...but the airline operating in a more
competitive area of the aviation system, where economic margins are extremely
constrained, may simply be unable to undertake all of the desirable training and
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standardizationofequipmentwithoutgoingoutofbusiness.Theregulatoryauthority
mayhaveconsiderabledifficultiesincompellingsuchairlinestoundertakecostly
proceduresa theairlinesmayaccuratelypointoutthatbydoingsotheywillbemade
lesscostefficientvisavisforeignoperators(possiblyoperatingina lessregulated
environment)withwhomtheycompetedirectly...Thet mptationforoperatorand
regulatoralike,whenfacedwithanacknowledgedbutintractableproblem,is to
undertakesomeunconsciousdi sonanceresolutionbyregardingtheproblemasless
seriousthantheymightif it werereadilysoluble.(Green,1990,p510)
If thisconcernappliestoaviationsystemsdevelopersandsuppliersaswellasto the
operatingcompanies,thentheimpactontheworkabilityofanycertificationprocessmaybe
serious.
To certify or not to certify?
So, why is someone who typically dislikes regulation, systematisation and quality assurance
generally writing here to support certification in complex systems? The answer lies in what has
been stressed above, namely that the systemic outcomes of having a certification programme in
place may be advantageous enough to overcome any drawbacks of the regulatory regime and
the content of any standards.
As a start, if human factors certification is to work in any domain we need to consider why it
has not been in place there previously and address all potential reasons very seriously. The
author is currently working with a very large, reputable transnational company. The design
engineers pass their designs through every conceivable review and approval process - HAZOP,
P & I Approval, Environmental Impact Assessment, Engineering Audit etc. - but, at the
moment, there is not any human factors approval. We asked ourselves why such an absence of
any formal human factors standards approval system exists. Possible reasons include:
• Historicaily, ergonomics has not been seen as important by engineers, managers etc.
• Ergonomics has been assumed to be included in all the other types of approvals and
standards.
• Certification of human factors is not seen as cost-effective (in terms of there being few
gains); there will still be problems afterwards (since people are seen as fallible), but
much time and energy will have been expended meanwhile.
• Certification is genuinely seen, by engineers and/or ergonomists as not required
• Human factors certification may be resisted by ergonomists themselves, perhaps
because of the requirements or restrictions it may put on them.
• Certification is seen as impossible to do, or at least impossible to do well.
Before even beginning to introduce ergonomics design review to this company, before even
planning what might be included, we need to examine these reasons, see which are apparent in
this case, and address the organisation issues involved.
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The Case Against
There are two ways to mount a defence of certification: to counter or at least downplay the
criticisms, and to promote advantages and benefits. Taking first the criticisms, a number of
arguments against certification have been rehearsed implicitly or explicitly in this paper.
Certification may firstly be seen as unnecessary; presumably in this view either there is little
or no room for improvement in ergonomic design of systems (hardly a sustainable argument) or
else that the aviation world is self-correcting. That is, up to a point human factors deficiencies
will be rectified anyway during development and commissioning and where they are too large
or deep seated then the system itself will not remain in operation. I find this argument
unconvincing unless we allow major failures in operation to also be a part of this self correcting
process. However, what must be accepted is that, currently, we are talking about remarkably
reliable and safe systems of hardware, software, procedures, communications and people.
An extension of the first objection is that certification is unnecessary for simple and/or
relatively stable systems and is impossible to do adequately for complex systems. There may be
some validity to this argument but the advantages of an improved quality of development
process discussed below might counteract it to some extent. What must be recognised, though,
is that any system of approvals must allow for trade-offs between human factors and between
human and technical factors in its operation.
Further criticism might be that a certification regime is restrictive and cumbersome. If we
replace "is" by "can be" then I would agree here. However, if we aim certification at
performance and at assessments as against at design specifications, allow tailoring of standards
to meet circumstances, and - most importantly - make ergonomics design review and approvals
an intrinsic part of development rather than an extraneous add-on, this will all help dilute this
complaint. Similarly, we can meet objections that certification might stifle innovation and lead
to homogeneity in design.
Certification might also be criticised on the grounds of its being misdirected, with standards
aimed only at reducing the incidence or consequences of active errors. In this view, standards
may be much less help with latent failures or resident pathogens in the system; these are the
system problems which may have lain dormant in the system for a long time and which are
spawned by the activities of designers, managers and, indeed, regulators themselves (Reason,
1990). One could take a positive view though, that in fact it is these "violations", giving rise to
latent errors, which are best attacked through a process of certification, due to the process itself
being a good discipline upon all involved in high level planning and decision making.
As for a fourth set of criticisms, that certification is untestable, widely unacceptable and thus
unworkable or unenforceable, this will largely be a function of the particular regulatory regime.
To repeat again an earlier point, if a system of certification can be constructed such that it is
seen to improve and streamline the development process and time as well as increase systems
integrity, then acceptance will be more widespread.
The Case For
The case for certification can be made positively, as well as by minimising the validity or
consequences of criticisms as above. Three areas of benefit may be defined, all systemic in
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nature in that they emanate from the fact that human factors certification of complex systems
will have effects beyond defining and ensuring compliance with human factors standards.
First, we have the improvements in the design process that might be expected. Knowledge
that a system must be certified in terms of human factors may not ensure all correct detail design
alternatives are chosen - indeed, there is no such thing as a perfect design given all the trade-
offs that must be made. However, it will mean a greater likelihood that all relevant issues are
addressed and their consequences assessed much earlier in development. Costly changes after
prototyping or even during commissioning trials can be reduced in frequency and extent. A
related benefit is that for any suppliers to be able to meet future certification requirements,
technical and financial decision makers will have to coordinate much earlier and better with
those responsible for the human factors.
A second benefit is predicted, based upon experience in other domains where ergonomics
standards have been introduced or toughened. In the act of formulating, specifying and testing
the process and procedures necessary to allow systems to be certified, the human factors
community will have to respond to pressures for better methods, techniques and criteria, and
will have to validate, justify and report them better.
Finally, this improved "professionalism" in human factors, the perceived benefits to the
design process, and - if experience in industrial health and safety and ergonomics is any guide
- increased interest of engineers in the resulting need for increased problem solving, will all act
to produce a more human-centred design approach. Thus, through both the fact and process of
certification, as much or more than by its content, the design of complex aviation systems will
be improved.
Conclusions
We should not talk of certification only as a choice of two options - to certify or not to certify.
If we draw an analogy in politics, like saying that electorates have a choice between the
authoritarian right (prescription, control, punitive consequences of non-compliance) and the
libertarian right (the individual has an absolute right to do as he/she pleases, and the 'market'
will ensure instability is kept in bounds), such debates see anarchy as the only outcome if a
choice between the two options is not made. There are other paths in government however,
whereby individuals have rights or freedoms but also responsibilities towards society, and
where society attempts to redress imbalances in power. Thus, a regime of certification can be
implemented such that it provides a framework for complex systems design, a benchmark to
aim for, and a bulwark against very poor design, whilst still allowing for innovation and not
imposing too costly or cumbersome a design regime.
What must be addressed before instituting a formal certification system are the needs of such
a programme. Benefits will be realised and disadvantages or problems minimised only when
decisions are made on:
• Distinctions to be made and balance to be found between attribute, performance,
personnel and process certification
• Desirable degree of prescription or latitude for design
• Identification, definition, agreement and validation of test methods, measures, criteria
etc.
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• Provision for flexibility and updating of requirements
• Examination of trade-offs between value and cost/time of the certification process
• Systems to certify the certifiers/certification systems
• Communication of outcomes of the certification process in more useful terms than just a
pass/fail, yes/no judgement
• Consideration of implications of non-conformance, and thus enforcement
It must be stressed once again that the process of certification can be of value even if we are
unsure of or unhappy about the content when it is first instituted. More than this, if we get the
process right, then content problems - in appropriate requirements or missing tools or data for
instance - will be rectified as part of the process being put into operation. We must remember,
though, that the individuals who produce certification processes or who test and approve
systems are themselves fallible, as also will be any intelligent systems built to help with
certification. Perhaps this is the key issue for acceptance of certification - Quis custodiet ipsos
custodes?
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